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Transformation of Diplomatic Elites in  
Post-Communist Societies 
Diana Digol  
Abstract: »Die Transformation der diplomatischen Elite in postkommunisti-
schen Gesellschaften«. This article addresses the transformation of the diplo-
matic elite in the post-communist period, based on the results of the compre-
hensive survey. The analysis demonstrated that in the majority of the countries 
surveyed diplomats were drawn disproportionately from a very exclusive seg-
ment of society: the urban intelligentsia. Furthermore, the picture of a diplomat 
from a post communist country is similar to that of a diplomat from any west-
ern country. In other words, the diplomats in post communist countries are re-
cruited from the same strata from which the diplomats in countries experienc-
ing political stability would normally be recruited. In those few countries 
where a break up with the regime prevented the majority of the urban elite 
from being considered reliable by new regime, preference was given to persons 
with rural background, overwhelmingly men. 
Keywords: diplomatic elite, elite continuity, post-communist transformation, 
gender. 
Introduction 
In this article I address the transformation of the diplomatic elite in the post-
communist period. Elites are often seen as the initiators of political order 
changes in all types of society and in various circumstances (Higley and Pakul-
ski 2000). The opposite is also argued to be true: changes in political orders are 
often expected to be reflected in the changes in elites, particularly in the politi-
cal elite.  
Classical theories distinguish between “routine” elite circulation and “crisis” 
circulation. The first processes, also referred to as the “social reproduction” 
process, is a process through which the elite assures its stability by allowing a 
controlled small influx of people of lower social status to take up a place in the 
upper level of society. The second process refers to a fundamental change in 
the elite composition due to deep fundamental disturbances in society. Higley 
and Pakulski (Higley and Pakulski 2000) contribute to this division another two 
dimensions: the scope and mode of circulation. This scope can be narrow or 
wide as it can be shallow or deep. It is narrow if only the people in top posi-
tions are replaced, and it is wide if it affects all elite position holders. It is shal-
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low if the top elites are replaced by those from the second-level of elites, and it 
is deep if top elites are replaced by new people, be it from the ranks of counter-
elites or from outside the elite establishment altogether. Similarly, the mode of 
circulation is gradual and negotiated when elites are replaced through voluntary 
resignations, retirements, and transfers; the mode is sudden and coerced if 
elites are overthrown or replaced violently. Based on these dimensions, Higley 
and Pakulski distinguish four types of circulation: classic, replacement, quasi-
replacement and reproduction.  
With this in mind, I have examined a specific and particular sector of the po-
litical elite, namely the diplomatic service. Very little has been learned particu-
larly about the diplomatic elites, despite a great accumulation of theoretical and 
empirical knowledge on political elites in general. Furthermore, no study of the 
fundamental characteristics of these new diplomats has been reported, although 
several studies have been carried out at intervals in the past (Bailey 1979; Harr 
1965). The aim of this study is to take a first step in the process of exploring 
modern diplomatic elites in the post-communist states of Europe and Asia. 
Analysing the profiles of the people and the ways used to secure a position in 
the diplomatic elite allowed to answer the question of which groups of people 
were favoured at the entry level into the diplomatic elite and institutions of 
post-communist countries. A conclusion will thus be attempted as to whether 
among emerging diplomatic elites the process of circulation of elites prevailed 
over that of reproduction, or vice versa. 
Two criteria distinguish this study. First, there are space and time limita-
tions. Geographically, the study is limited to post-communist countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The period of time exam-
ined is limited to the first decade and a half after the break-up of the old 
political regime, roughly after 1989. Second, the focus is upon entry-level 
diplomats to a greater degree than was the case in older works on political elite 
and diplomacy. This focus is not merely of academic interest. Entry-level dip-
lomats then, are the persons who represent the Foreign Service decision-
making process today and will increasingly do so in the near future.  
In the next sections, the survey data is described, providing basic character-
istics of those queried as well as exploring in depths the general sociological 
characteristics of these diplomats, including their education, family background 
and social origins as well as their professional experience. The findings are 
then integrated into a general portrait of the entry-level post-communist diplo-
mat. Equipped with knowledge about the essential characteristics of diplomats, 
the hypothesis of elite circulation versus elite reproduction among diplomats in 
the post-communist countries will be addressed.  
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Survey Data 
The sample for this research was drawn from data available in the 1990-2004 
yearbooks of the Diplomatic Academy (DA), Vienna, on the participants in the 
special course, solely aimed at the young diplomats from the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union participants (DA Vienna 
1990-2004). This is the most suitable from known databases available for the 
purposes of this research. As one of the first specialized diplomatic training 
programmes offered to diplomats from post-socialist countries, the programme 
at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna has been exceptional in its continuity 
(more than 10 years) and coverage of countries, areas of training (political, 
economic, legal and security dimensions including international relations, 
international economics and international law as well as international security 
subjects) and in the number of participants. An effort has been made by the DA 
to ensure a fair gender distribution and to maintain an age limit. This database 
was used to reach out the participants. The research itself was based on a 36-
question, English-language survey of this “population”. 130 of the 449 ques-
tionnaires were returned, for a rate of reply of 30%. The distribution of replies 
by country, age group, gender and level of educations was balanced overall. 
Non-reply was also not found to be a source of bias. All of these factors spoke 
in favour of the representativeness of the sample. 
Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Diplomats 
A thorough examination of the characteristics of the respondents, with a focus 
on educational background, family background, and social origins, was carried 
out. The educational background was determined by the highest educational 
degree obtained and the specialization chosen. The family characteristics of 
respondents were investigated by analysing the family status and family size of 
respondents, ethnic origins and language profile, religious beliefs and their area 
of residence. An examination of social origins was made through an analysis of 
parents’ education and parents’ professional occupation, the size of the parents’ 
family and parents’ divorce rate. An additional point of interest, also dealt with 
in this section, was whether the respondents had relatives in the diplomatic 
service. 
A comprehensive look was taken at the professional career of the respon-
dents: how they entered the Foreign Service of their countries; what previous 
professional experience, if any, they had; or whether they had developed any 
parallel careers or had done any additional jobs.  
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Education  
The respondents differ from the general population by being uniformly better 
educated. Hence, the majority of respondents (more than 50%) reported having 
a Master’s degree; the second largest group of respondents had a University 
(Bachelor’s) degree (>30%); the smallest group (just over 10%) reported hav-
ing a PhD degree. Cumulatively, the Master’s and PhD groups account for 
almost 70% of the sample. To put this into perspective, for none of the coun-
tries under study did the percentage of the population studying for an under-
graduate university degree or higher exceed 24% of the general population in 
the 20-30 age group, while among diplomats 100% had at least a university 
(Bachelor’s) degree (UN 1980-2003). One should also specify that the level of 
educations (at least Bachelor’s degree) is one of the essential requirements of 
newcomers into diplomacy.  
Diplomats attended a university in the capital city and study abroad. In all 
but one of the countries surveyed, the majority (90%) of the diplomats attended 
a university in the capital city. The exception is Estonia. In this case, two out of 
three respondents reported attending the University of Tartu. However, given 
the small number of answers, it cannot be assumed that this represents a differ-
ence between Estonia and the other countries, but rather reflects this particular 
data set.  
A few respondents reported attending a university abroad, either for their 
undergraduate education or for a more advanced degree. Although the total 
number was small (28), some tendencies can be noted.  
- Tendency 1: ‘University in the ‘former’ capital city’. The survey identified a 
tendency to attend a metropolitan university in what formerly were federa-
tion-type states even after the change of political regime and the break-away 
of certain entities. Hence, respondents from the former national republics of 
the Soviet Union still pursued a degree from Moscow’s universities, while 
respondents from the former constituent parts of Yugoslavia attended the 
university in Belgrade.  
- Tendency 2: ‘Neighbourhood university’. Another tendency is an intra-
federal exchange of students, which refers to cases in which an exchange 
took place inside the borders of what was then the same country: a student 
from Turkmenistan attended a university in Ukraine, a student from Kyr-
gyzstan attended a university in Uzbekistan and a student from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina attended a university in Croatia.  
- Tendency 3: ‘Direction West’. Beginning with the period roughly corres-
ponding to Gorbachev’s ascension to power, there has been a new trend in 
the destination of students seeking to pursue higher education. This trend is 
towards the established western universities in Germany, the UK, France 
and the US.  
- Tendency 4: ‘Direction Middle East/Asia’. This tendency applies to young 
diplomats from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in which 
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respondents attended universities in Syria, Korea, etc. This tendency likely 
developed after the proclamation of independence of these countries. At that 
moment, they began to redefine their geo-political place and position and 
thus probably became more interested in establishing ties with neighbouring 
or close countries, with which relations had been somewhat neglected in the 
past.  
- Tendency 5: ‘Professional schools’. Within the MFA, respondents attended 
specialized Diplomatic Schools in France, Malta, Spain or the US. Of 
course, all the respondents in this study also attended a training programme 
at the DA, Vienna.  
Future diplomats specialise in a variety of subjects. Diplomacy and interna-
tional relations scored high (19.8%) among specializations pursued by respon-
dents while earning their highest reported education degree. However, law was 
the most frequently reported specialization: every fourth diplomat in the sample 
had a law degree. Other specializations were economics (12.4%), philology 
(10.7%), political science (9.9%) and history (9.1%). Overall, more than 80% 
of respondents had a degree in one of the six disciplines: foreign affairs, law, 
economics, political science, history, or philology. Moreover, almost every 
second respondent (45.5% (55 respondents)) had specialized in an ‘interna-
tional’ subject area, be it international relations, international law, international 
economics or the history of international relations. Nevertheless, only 20% of 
future diplomats actually had a degree in a subject directly related to foreign 
affairs (that is diplomacy or international relations). Arguably, it might be that 
not all respondents intended to become diplomats when starting their educa-
tion. It could also be that, given the high status of their families (as shown 
later), and thus probably better access to information and an easier path to the 
prestigious educational disciplines but not necessarily to greater wealth (a 
special feature of the former communist societies), future diplomats did not 
have to make professional choices early in their lives. They could afford to stay 
longer in education, concentrate on following a prestigious specialization (such 
as law or economics) first and could then decide on the area of its applicability. 
Or, alternatively, they may have considered international relations to be a sub-
ject which could be studied later (for an advanced degree) or in practice (di-
rectly on the job or in a training course, such as those at the DA), while lan-
guage skills (e.g., the relatively high percentage of philologists) or knowledge 
of law and economics had to be acquired beforehand. Another explanation 
might be that, at the time the post-communist diplomatic services were estab-
lished, the need for people with foreign language skills was high (especially in 
the new countries) and thus many people with a degree in philology were at-
tracted to the diplomatic service. Or it could be that an explicit policy to change 
the former communist political elites led to a situation in which criteria other 
than a specialized education in foreign affairs took priority, and this might 
explain the presence of so many people with specializations only tenuously 
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related to diplomacy. It could also be that the respondents were initially not 
planning to work in diplomacy because, at that moment, the possibility was 
seen as remote. However, with the political transformations that took place in 
the 1990s, many previously provincial cities became capitals of the new states 
needing to set up their diplomatic services. Thus a remote possibility thereafter 
became a viable possibility. It might also have coincided with the period when 
recent school graduates were deciding upon their career paths and a new option 
seemed attractive.  
The high percentage of lawyers among all respondents is probably explained 
by the general perception that law is an appropriate background for diplomacy, 
as well as by the special needs of countries in political transition to negotiate 
new treaties, change alliances, join international organizations and find their 
‘legal’ place in the international system. During this time of transition, the 
skills and capacities of lawyers are indispensable.  
Diplomats speak several foreign languages. The linguistic skills of respon-
dents were assessed through the number of languages, both native and foreign, 
spoken. Thus, the respondents were asked to specify their native language(s) 
and other languages in which they were proficient. The most frequent mentions 
made of foreign languages spoken were English (126), German (48), French 
(33), Italian (14) and Russian (12). More than 50% of respondents spoke two or 
more of these languages, while 40% spoke one of the five. The most common 
combinations were English/German (48), English/French (33), English/Italian 
(14), German/French (13), English/Russian (12), and German/Italian and Ger-
man/Russian, with 8 cases each. Other foreign languages (as for example, 
Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, Hebrew, etc.) were also mentioned by a 
group of respondents.  
One-third of the respondents spoke only one foreign language. The over-
whelming majority spoke two or three foreign languages. While some people 
spoke four or five foreign languages, this was rare. Additional analysis showed 
that half of the people speaking four to five languages were philologists, while 
the other half were not. Furthermore, an independent-samples t-test conducted 
to compare the number of languages spoken by respondents with a degree in 
philology and without such a degree could not confirm that the respondents 
with either an initial or a final degree in philology spoke more languages than 
other respondents in the sample. It is possible that their knowledge of certain 
foreign language was better or superior to the knowledge of the same languages 
among respondents. However, an analysis of this point would have gone be-
yond the scope of the present study.  
Combining native and foreign languages, as many as 50% of respondents 
spoke four or more languages. Another large group were respondents speaking 
‘only’ three languages. It would have been particularly interesting to compare 
the language skills of diplomats with the language skills of the population in 
general or the population with university education. However, it was not possi-
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ble to obtain statistics on the language skills of the general population or those 
with university education in the countries under study. Thus, an expectation 
that is necessarily speculative – is that diplomats know more languages than the 
general population and possibly than other people with the same level (but with 
different specializations) of education.  
Family and Social Origins 
Profiles of similarities and differences in the family background of respondents 
were compiled first by analysing gender and age, family status of respondents 
(single, married, divorced, widowed) and family size (number of children of 
respondents). Secondly, ethnic origins (titular nation, national minority) and 
religious beliefs were analysed. Thirdly, the respondents’ area of residence at 
two points in time (the present and the time the respondents were 15 years old) 
was considered. Whether respondents had any relatives in diplomacy was ana-
lysed as well.  
The age range of respondents (in 2005) was 23-51 years; the average age for 
both men and women was 33-34 years. 57% of the respondents were male (74) 
and 43% were female (56). Half of the respondents (65) were married, 42% 
(53) were single, slightly more than 6% (8) were divorced and less than 1% (1) 
were widowed. There was a strong positive correlation between family status 
single/married and the age of the respondents.  
Diplomats represent a titular nation. In terms of ethnic identity, the majority 
of the respondents (more than 90%) defined themselves as belonging to the 
titular nationality of their country. The only exception to this was in Belarus, 
where only one out of three respondents (33.3%) defined him/herself as be-
longing to the titular nation.  
One respondent each from Armenia, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan and Lithuania ex-
plicitly defined themselves as belonging to national minorities. In the case of 
Azerbaijan, two respondents defined themselves as Azeri Turkish, which ar-
guably can be considered as the titular nationality as well; however, since offi-
cial sources (CIA World Factbook 2006), define the population of Azerbaijan 
as Azerbaijani or Azeri, these two respondents were classified as not belonging 
to the titular nation. In an additional case from Lithuania, the person referred to 
him/herself as ‘European’.  
Thus, one could conclude that the new diplomatic services are reserved for 
titular nations. However, one should keep in mind that the concept of the titular 
nation was, at the time of this survey, itself a subject of change, in particular in 
new countries.  
Diplomats profess the country’s mainstream religion. The results obtained 
for religious beliefs are similar to the results obtained for ethnicity – the diplo-
mats tend to belong to the mainstream religion in their respective countries. 
There are, however, some significant differences. The most noticeable case is 
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Albania, where none of the respondents reported being Muslim. Armenia is 
also complicated, and this was probably due to the choices provided. Thus, the 
Armenian Apostolic Church was likely viewed by some as Orthodox Christian-
ity, while other respondents may have argued that it is closer to the Protestant 
Church (and thus defined themselves as Protestant) and still others would have 
defined themselves as belonging to the ‘other’ grouping. The cases of the 
Czech Republic and Estonia closely reflect the situation in the general popula-
tion: more than 60% of the population in each country are unaffiliated (CIA 
World Factbook 2006). The results for Latvia seem to suggest that the majority 
of respondents either adhere to a religion other than the mainstream religion or 
are unaffiliated (75%, 14 respondents). Thus, with the noticeable exceptions of 
Albania and Latvia, the respondents, in their religious beliefs, were well repre-
sentative of the majority of the population of their countries.  
Diplomats come from urban areas, mainly from the capital city. The survey 
questionnaire provided a choice among ‘capital city’, ‘other city’ and ‘rural 
area’; the respondents had the opportunity to define the area of residence at the 
time of survey and when they were 15 years old. The threshold of 15 years old 
was chosen to reveal the ‘original’ area of residence of future diplomats. It has 
been observed that some young people not originally from the capital city start 
defining themselves as being from the capital city after studying at its univer-
sity or after getting their first job or renting a flat there, etc. Since the object 
was to uncover the original background of the respondents, 15 was selected as 
the threshold age. Thus people who were born and attended school in other 
areas were given a chance to specify this. This also helped to avoid miscalcu-
lating the proportion of the respondents with a capital city background.  
The analysis of the current area of residence showed that 63% of the future 
diplomats originally resided and still reside in the capital city. Only 9% identi-
fied themselves as coming from a rural background. The remaining ones came 
from other urban areas. The analysis of the area of residence at the time the 
respondents were 15 years old yielded similar results. The small difference 
between the categories of ‘capital city’ and ‘other urban areas’ is explained by 
the fact that, since the transformation of the political landscape in the 1990s, 
several cities have became the capitals of the new states, Bratislava being one 
example. Thus, the diplomats are urban residents and in more than half of the 
cases, they are capital city residents. It is unusual for a diplomat to come from a 
rural area.  
No diplomatic dynasties? Despite the widely held belief that diplomats tend 
to form a club, society, class or caste that is self-recruiting (Craig 1953), with 
strong hereditary traditions and closed to the entry of newcomers, a significant 
majority of respondents (75%, 97 cases) reported having no relatives in the 
diplomatic service. There were respondents who mentioned having such rela-
tives (11.5%, 15 cases); other 15% of respondents (18 persons) did not answer 
this question. It is difficult to assess whether they did not answer because they 
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did not have relatives in the diplomatic service and thus believed that the ques-
tion did not apply to them; or because they had such relatives but did not want 
to reveal this fact.  
The fact that the majority of diplomats did not have relatives in the diplo-
matic service might indicate at least two points. First, if the diplomatic dynas-
ties existed in the communist times, they were destroyed. This is particularly 
relevant to the countries that inherited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the 
previous regime and adopted a ‘lustration’ law (Poland, the Czech Republic). 
This would also imply that intergenerational exchange of skills, knowledge and 
experience was probably totally or partially lost. Second, it could also reflect a 
trend, familiar in the civil service in other modern states, according to which 
kinship relations play a decreasing role in public sphere careers (Putnam 1976, 
23).  
Diplomats come from intact families. The questions about social origins 
(through the family of origin) were framed around three areas: size of the fam-
ily, divorce rate and the level of parents’ education. The results of the family 
and divorce rate analyses suggest that the respondents largely came from intact 
families (80%, 103) and had either one brother or one sister (58.5%, 72) or 
were only children (17.1%, 21 cases). There were two exceptionally large 
families with 8 and 10 children respectively. Only in 15% of the cases were the 
parents of respondents divorced. This is a very low divorce rate indeed com-
pared to the general populations in those countries. Why might this be impor-
tant? It could suggest that a traditional intact family background serves as a 
good prerequisite for a future diplomat.  
Diplomats come from educated families. An initial look at the educational 
level of the parents reveals that the majority of the diplomats’ fathers (58%) 
and mothers (55%) had university degrees or the equivalent. More fathers than 
mothers had a PhD degree or higher, while more mothers than fathers had just 
a high school education. Most fathers (72%) were married to mothers with the 
same educational level, with 21% of families having a high school education, 
43% of families having a university education, and 8% of families having a 
PhD degree. Thus, there was a clear tendency among the parents of future 
diplomats to marry a person with the same educational level, which corre-
sponds to the tendency characteristic of the general population as well (Bloss-
feld et al. 2003). Compared to the pattern of enrolment in tertiary education in 
society, it is clear that the parents of respondents form a group of highly edu-
cated people in all the societies examined (UN 1980-2003). 
Thus, not only the respondent him/herself but also his/her parents were edu-
cated people residing, as a rule, in an urban area. Thus, one can conclude that 
the respondents generally came from families of urban intellectu-
als/intelligentsia. This could also be indicative of the process of ‘elite multipli-
cation’.  
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Professional Experience 
The professional career of the respondents was explored by looking at several 
key aspects: previous career, channels of recruitment into the national Foreign 
Service, and parallel career/additional jobs.  
Diplomatic work is the main occupation of diplomats. The overwhelming 
majority of respondents were serving their countries as diplomats. More than 
90% (119 cases) of the respondents at the time of the survey either had a posi-
tion in the headquarters of the Foreign Service (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or 
were on diplomatic missions abroad. Moreover, another 3.8% (five respon-
dents) held positions in the government which are considered part of the na-
tional diplomatic service according to the laws of their respective countries. 
These positions included: advisor to the head of state or head of government, 
press secretary of the head of state, and employee in the special portfolio minis-
try/department for European integration or defence. Only 4% (six respondents) 
had occupations unrelated to diplomacy.  
The current diplomatic rank of the subjects revealed that the respondents 
were still young diplomatic professionals, with 75% of them having a rank 
between attaché and 1st secretary. However, there were 19 counsellors (16%), 
7 ministers (6%) and 3 ambassadors (2.5%). As can be expected, diplomatic 
rank was strongly correlated with age – younger respondents had a lower rank, 
middle age-respondents had middle ranks and older respondents had a high 
diplomatic rank.  
However, as noted above, only 30% of the participants in the Diplomatic 
Academy courses actually returned the questionnaire. It may be that many of 
the non-respondents failed to reply because they were no longer in the diplo-
matic service and thus either were not reached or felt that the research was 
irrelevant to them. This suggests that the actual drop-out rate may be higher 
than it appears when looking only at the current position of respondents. How-
ever, there is no statistical data to further quantify the drop-out rate in general 
or by country.  
Diplomats experienced other walks of life first. The question about the pre-
vious career and parallel career (or additional jobs) during service in the diplo-
matic corps was open-ended. It had been hoped, ideally, to elicit a full, up-to-
date career life of the respondents, including all the positions prior to entry into 
the diplomatic service, positions at the headquarters of the MFA, any postings 
abroad while in the Foreign Service, and positions held after the respondents 
left the MFA if applicable.  
However, 27.7% (36 respondents) provided no answer to the question. 
There is not enough information to determine why they did not reply to the 
question – whether because the current position was the first in their career, or 
whether they believed that the previous position(s) held were not significant, or 
simply because the answer to the question required extensive writing. How-
ever, it could be seen that almost 60% of those who did not provide an answer 
 101 
among the respondents were young people; hence, the explanation that the 
current position might be the first position held by the respondents in question 
seems viable.  
Among people who are now part of the Foreign Service (119), slightly more 
than 1/3 of the respondents (34.5%, 41) had held more than one position; only 
10% of respondents had held two or more positions. The rest (65.5%, 78 re-
spondents) either had not held any professional position prior to joining the 
Foreign Service or did not provide an answer.  
Among those who had held professional position(s) prior to joining the dip-
lomatic corps, half of the respondents spent no more than two years in these 
positions. In this group, majority had spent one year or less in another career. 
On the other hand, the group of respondents who had spent five years or more 
in such a previous post was almost the same size as the group of respondents 
with a 1-year prior career. And almost half of that group were respondents who 
had spent 10 or more years in other careers. Thus, within the group of respon-
dents who had had previous careers, the group of almost no career and a group 
with a serious previous professional career were both strongly represented. 
This suggests the existence of two groups among newcomers to diplomacy: (1) 
young with no or only a brief previous professional experience; and (2) older 
with medium or long previous professional experience.  
During their diplomatic careers the majority of diplomats 63.8% (83), had 
changed their positions at least once. 46.9% (61) had had three or fewer posi-
tions, and only 15% (22 people) had four or more positions. This finding is in 
line with the fact that the majority of diplomats were young and relatively new 
to the Foreign Service.  
More than 90% of the respondents for whom data are available changed po-
sitions in 3 years or less on the average. 50% changed their positions in 1-2 
years, 30% in 2-3 years, and 15% in 1 year or less.  
Again, the range of replies varied significantly. Moreover, a look at the dip-
lomatic laws of several countries suggests that there are essentially different 
hierarchies of diplomatic positions, although in many instances they are quite 
close to each other. Diplomats are also moved between the MFA and a mission, 
either at the same horizontal level or upward on a vertical scale. However, in 
one country of the former Soviet Union, the policy of the MFA is such that 
every posting to a mission abroad goes hand-in-hand with downward mobility 
in position. The reason is that a posting abroad is desirable enough (in the first 
instance, probably financially motivated) that there will be personnel prepared 
to accept such a condition. Differences in the diplomatic scale and differences 
in MFA policies made it difficult to compare positions at headquarters and in 
missions across and within different countries. It could not be determined with 
any certainty whether a change in position also meant a professional/career 
promotion (vertical movement) or merely horizontal (or even downward) mo-
bility. Therefore, the issue of the speed of promotion is not further discussed.  
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Diplomats pursue parallel careers. One question asked whether respondents 
had pursued parallel careers or had held any additional jobs while working in 
the MFA. Although it was an open-end question, the respondents were also 
given suggestions about potential answers, such as whether they were teaching 
at the university, providing consultancy or translating/interpreting services, 
giving language tutorials, publishing articles, etc.  
Overall, only one-third of the respondents had held any additional jobs 
while working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (35.4%, 46). Most often, the 
respondents would use their knowledge of foreign languages to engage in 
translating/interpreting services (30.6%, 19). Otherwise, they taught part-time 
in universities (27.4%, 17) or published articles (22.6%, 14). Only in 8.15% of 
the cases (5) had a respondent combined his/her job with further studies and in 
another 6.5% (4) had also offered consultancy services. Another 4.8% (3) had 
given language tutorials.  
To sum up, the majority had not had any additional job while serving in the 
diplomatic corps. Among those who had had such an additional job, the most 
popular categories were: teaching at the university, translating/interpreting 
services and publishing articles (TTP trio), all involving the use of intellectual 
capital.  
Diplomats went through a competitive recruitment examination. A recruit-
ment examination was the normal channel for the majority of subjects. As 
many as one-third said that they had had to pass an examination prior to be-
coming a part of the Foreign Service of their respective countries. As a rule, 
they had replied to an announcement in the mass media. The next largest cate-
gory (21%, 33 people) revealed that they had joined the MFA at the personal 
invitation of one of the recruiters of the MFA; less than one-fourth of these (8) 
had also been obliged to take a recruitment examination. Another 19% (30) 
remained in the MFA after doing an internship: only three people from this 
latter group had also taken the recruitment examination. Yet another 7% (11) 
had joined the MFA by transferring from other positions in the civil service. 
Almost 2% (3) were promoted from technical personnel to the diplomatic 
ranks, and less than 1% (1) had acquired a position in the MFA as a political 
appointee. 4% (6) said they did not fit any of the categories above and did not 
further specify their mode of entry into the Foreign Service. 
Overall, an examination was the main recruitment channel by which the ma-
jority of respondents entered into national Foreign Service. However, a per-
sonal invitation by one of the recruiters remained a significant channel through 
which aspiring candidates make their way into diplomacy. Another successful 
path was by interning in the MFA. The need to take the recruitment examina-
tion in this case was obviated by virtue of the personal invitation or internship 
experience.  
Many respondents answered that both the ‘participation in the recruitment 
examination’ and an ‘announcement in mass media (newspapers, TV, etc)’ 
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were applicable to them. Thus, it can be supposed that the media is increasingly 
becoming a tool by which recruitment examinations are announced, and this 
indicates a certain openness by and accessibility of the Foreign Service.  
Another frequent combination was ‘after doing an internship with the MFA’ 
and ‘personal invitation by one of the recruiters of the MFA’. The direction of 
interaction could go both ways: some respondents received personal invitations 
to join the MFA first as interns, and then later became employees. Others re-
ceived personal invitations to join the MFA after a successful internship period. 
The criteria used by the people who invited candidates into the Foreign Service 
– whether there were personal relationships between the recruiters and candi-
dates, or whether the recruiters were looking for special credentials in the can-
didates or whether the criteria were altogether different – are unknown. Over-
all, the practice of issuing a personal invitation to join the Foreign Service is a 
good example of the cooptation of elites, which in periods of stability would 
serve as strong evidence of the reproduction of elites. 
Gender  
Comparison along gender lines did not constitute the focus of this study, how-
ever the analysis of the database revealed some interesting observations which 
are presented here for the judgements by the reader.  
Family Status 
Despite that there was a strong positive correlation between family status sin-
gle/married and the age of the respondents; there was a difference in the pattern 
between men and women. While 63% of women (32) were single and only 
37% of women (19) were married, it was the reverse with men. Only 32% of 
the men (21) were still single and 68% (46) were married. This difference held 
true when the relationship was controlled for the age of respondents. The ex-
planation for this pattern is not clear. There may possibly be a surplus of 
women in some of the societies under study which would explain why more 
women than men remain unmarried. However, it could also be that a (diplo-
matic) career has different effects on the personal life of female diplomats than 
it does on male diplomats, adding to the world wide evidence that women in 
high-powered demanding careers may still be less likely to be married than are 
men in the same careers. 
State Religion 
The analysis of respondents, grouped according to the state religion, elucidated 
a difference in the percentage of women in these research groups. In the Catho-
lic research group, the proportion of women to men is 50/50. In both the Mus-
lim and Orthodox research groups, the proportion of women to men is 40/60. In 
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the Protestant research group, less than 20% are men and more than 80% of 
respondents are women. However, when gender distribution in the sample is 
compared with gender distribution in tertiary education of the total population, 
the Orthodox research group turns out to have a disproportionably high number 
of men in diplomacy, followed by the Muslim research group, while the Protes-
tant research group turns out to have a disproportionably high number of 
women. In the Catholic research group, men are only slightly overrepresented. 
Thus, it can be asserted that the Foreign Services in Orthodox countries favour 
men, while those in Protestant countries favour women. This first finding is 
counterintuitive; the expectation was that diplomacies in Muslim countries 
would strongly favour men, but there is no indication as to why the diplomacies 
in Orthodox countries would be similar in this respect. The second finding – 
that Protestant countries favour women – was altogether unexpected. The pos-
sible explanation can lie in the geographical vicinity to the Scandinavian coun-
tries, which are known for the best representation of women in politics, as well 
as in religious vicinity – as some of the Scandinavian countries are also Protes-
tant.  
General Portrait of the New Post-Communist Diplomat 
An average respondent in the sample of the entry-level post-communist diplo-
mats was a highly educated person. S/he studied at the university in the capital 
city of her/his country, and every second respondent had earned a Master’s 
degree. Furthermore, one in ten had already earned or was pursuing a PhD 
degree. Every fourth respondent specialized in law, as a rule international law; 
every fifth in foreign affairs (diplomacy or international relations) and every 
tenth in international economics for his/her highest degree. However, some of 
the respondents studied philology or other unrelated subjects for their first 
degree, and only later studied subjects related to foreign affairs. Respondents 
coming from formerly multinational states spoke two native languages. In 
addition, the young diplomats spoke two or more foreign languages, English 
usually being one of them.  
At the time of the study, the respondents were in their mid-thirties (33-34 
years), more likely to be married than single if a man and more likely to be 
single if a woman). He or she belonged to the titular nation of his/her country 
and also adhered to the mainstream religion of that country. 
S/he came from an intact family (her/his parents were not divorced) and s/he 
had one brother or sister. At the time s/he became a diplomat, her/his parents 
lived in the capital city. As a rule, both parents had at least a university degree. 
Very few diplomats have parents of modest social background (workers or 
farmers).  
For the most part s/he was the first diplomat in the family line. The normal 
path to becoming a diplomat is taking a recruitment examination. However, 
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there are important ‘side’ channels – personal invitation by one of the recruiters 
for the MFA or an internship with the MFA. If this is the case, there is usually 
no need to take the recruitment examination. 
In two out of three cases, the position with the MFA marked the beginning 
of a professional career. The new member of the Foreign Service was awarded 
either no diplomatic rank or a low diplomatic rank (attaché or 3rd secretary).  
After working three years or less, s/he changed position for the first time 
and roughly in another two years did so again. Whether this was always a pro-
motion or not is impossible to establish from the data. Furthermore, one in 
three diplomats held additional jobs, mainly using his or her intellectual capital. 
The most popular trio of jobs were teaching at a university, translat-
ing/interpreting services and publishing articles (TTP).  
As noted above, s/he is in her/his mid-thirties; yet, at the same time, and in 
the majority of cases, the job in the diplomatic corps is the first significant 
position. This suggests that there may possibly be two subgroups, namely the 
young and inexperienced (for whom a job in diplomacy is the first significant 
position), and the new and experienced (that is people already in their thirties 
or older who had had professional experience). 
Conclusion 
This article presented the results of the study of the diplomatic elites in the 
post-communist countries. Geographically, the research area was limited to the 
post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Chronologically, the study covered the period of a decade and a half 
after the change of the political regime (1989-2004).  
Based on classical theories of elite transformation, an attempt was made to 
demonstrate the social transformation of the diplomatic elites. The objective 
was to analyze which groups of people were favoured at the entry level of the 
diplomatic institutions of post communist Europe. The analysis was based on a 
survey, providing detailed information on respondents’ demographic character-
istics, educational and family background, social origins, and professional 
experiences and recruitment channels. The 130 questionnaires turned out to be 
a rich source of information, showing the general characteristics of entry-level 
diplomats in the post-communist countries. This ultimately led to large-scale 
social patterns being revealed by the survey data.  
The analysis of diplomats in post communist Europe demonstrated that dip-
lomats were not drawn proportionally from all segments of society. On the 
contrary, they were disproportionably drawn from a very exclusive segment of 
society: urban highly educated people, the urban intelligentsia. On the other 
side, the post-communist diplomats shared the features of other, less privileged 
strata of the society (such as holding parallel jobs to supplement their income), 
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which would not normally happen in the periods of political (and economic) 
stability.  
What does this tell us? The presence of these characteristics among the dip-
lomats under study points to the conclusion that entry-level diplomats have the 
features of the established modern elite. The picture of a diplomat from a post 
communist country is similar to the existing picture of a diplomat from any 
western country.  
This leads to two further observations: First, it is politically reassuring for 
western communities that functional elite with a certain set of qualities similar 
to those in western countries is coming into being. Second, it is theoretically 
comforting for political elite scholars that the diplomatic elite, a part of politi-
cal elite, is resistant to changes, maybe even particularly resistant to changes; 
even after a change of the political regime, diplomats continue to be recruited 
from a strata from which the diplomats would otherwise be recruited in a coun-
try experiencing a period of political stability. Nevertheless, the political trans-
formation adds social changes to the pattern of work and life of diplomats, 
otherwise, not typical to political elite.  
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